Self-deception in Ancient Philosophy
An International Conference
Athens, June 12-13, 2023
The phenomenon of self-deception introduces a host of philosophical and psychological problems. Their study, and the study of how they have been addressed in broader philosophical traditions, helps us gain a better understanding of our mind and the formation of our beliefs. Questions central to the philosophical discussion of self-deception may be divided into two kinds. On the one hand, conceptual questions regarding the definition of self-deception, and the understanding of its paradoxes. On the other hand, normative questions of whether self-deception is wrong, and whether the moral arguments against interpersonal deceiving apply to deceiving oneself.
The Conference will focus on responses explicitly or implicitly articulated in the philosophical traditions of the ancient Western world. The aim is to provide a constructive forum to explore this rather neglected topic. Papers may focus on particular thinkers, individual texts, or broader traditions from the Pre-Socratics up to the Hellenistic Schools.
Panagiotis Thanassas (NKU Athens): Self-deceptive mortals in Parmenides’ doxa
Walter Mesch (Münster): Plato on self-deceiving Sophists. The example of Gorgias
Sara De Leonardis (Cornell): Sightlovers (Rep. 476a–480a): a case of self-deception
Andrea Buongiorno (Oxford): Aristotle on perceptual self-deception
Brian Killackey (Catholic@Washington): An Aristotelian Case of Self-Deception Without Incompatible doxai
Ioannis Telios (NKU Athens): TBA
Christof Rapp (LMU Munich): Deceiving oneself about one’s own standing, merits and moral goodness. Themes from Aristotle’s moral psychology
Michail Pantoulias (NKU Athens): Practical truth and akrasia: Self-deception in the practical syllogism
Pavlos Kontos (UoPatras): Hope and self-deception
Kathryn Muyskens & Thomas Davis (Yale-NUS): Self-Deception Stoic-Style
Kelly Arenson (Duquesne): Epicureans on Hedonic Self-Deception